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The Supply of Catastrophe Insurance
Under Regulatory Constraints
1. Introduction
The significant increase in the risk of natural disasters in the U.S. has strained private
insurance markets and created troublesome problems for disaster-prone areas. The threat of mega-
catastrophes resulting from intense hurricanes or earthquakes striking major population centers has
dramatically altered the insurance environment. Estimates of probable maximum losses (PML) to
insurers from a mega-catastrophe range from $50-$115 billion depending on the location and intensity
of the event (RMS/ISO, 1995). Under current conditions, many insurers would become insolvent or
financially impaired if a mega-catastrophe occurred, with rippling effects throughout insurance
markets and the economy (ISO, 1996a).
Increased catastrophe risk poses difficult challenges for insurers, reinsurers, property
owners and public officials (Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1999). Insurers have sought to raise
their prices and decrease their exposure to catastrophe losses. However, state legislators and
insurance regulators have resisted insurers’ responses to increased risk in an attempt to preserve
the availability and affordability of insurance coverage (Klein, 1998).  Several states also have
established supplemental financing mechanisms for catastrophe risk to ease market pressures, but
the financial viability of these mechanisms is questionable; their financial structures are such that
they would incur large deficits in the event of a severe catastrophe causing large insured losses
(Marlett and Eastman, 1997).   Government policies have imposed significant cross-subsides from
low-risk to high-risk areas as well as cross-subsidies from non-catastrophe lines of insurance to
the catastrophe lines. These policies undermine incentives for managing catastrophe risk. The
current state of affairs is neither efficient nor sustainable. Private and public decision-makers are-2-
desperately searching for a politically feasible solution to this difficult problem.
Dissecting the dynamics of catastrophe insurance markets and understanding the effects of
government actions is critical to identifying a set of private and public measures that will enable
insurance markets to function effectively in managing catastrophe risks. There is a rich literature
on the supply of and demand for insurance for non-catastrophic risks, but less is understood about
how primary insurance markets respond to catastrophic risk. As concerns about natural disasters
have assumed center stage, economists have begun to explore the special problems they pose and
their implications for how insurance markets function (Russell and Jaffe, 1997).
This paper extends the existing literature by exploring several significant questions
concerning the supply of catastrophe insurance for residential property and insurers’ strategic
responses to the increased risk of natural disasters. Our analysis encompasses insurers’ decisions
with respect to: 1) the structure and geographic concentration of their risk portfolios; 2) contract
design, bundling of perils and cross marketing of products; 3) the purchase of reinsurance and use
of financial instruments to hedge catastrophe risk; and 4) the pricing of insurance for low-
probability, high-consequence (LPHC) events under significant uncertainty. We are particularly
interested in how insurers' market strategies are affected by the tradeoff between the efficiencies
in marketing, distribution/sales and claims adjustment gained from geographic concentration and
the higher risk associated with concentrated exposures subject to catastrophic perils and
correlated losses.
We examine insurers’ decisions under two different regulatory regimes: 1) minimal or non-
binding regulatory constraints; and 2) significant, binding regulatory constraints of the nature that
have been imposed in some high-risk states. We show that the emergence of geographically
concentrated, catastrophic perils and the imposition of binding regulatory constraints have-3-
significant implications for insurers’ decisions with respect to supplying insurance and structuring
their risk portfolios.
We limit our discussion to the risk of hurricanes which, for certain institutional reasons,
may have moderately different implications than earthquakes. Our analysis is primarily conceptual
and intuitive as an appropriate data set for empirical analysis is still being assembled. Where
feasible, we examine certain empirical data for Florida to test and support some of our assertions. 
Florida faces the greatest hurricane risk, which has imposed severe pressure on its insurance
markets and prompted the most restrictive regulatory responses of any state.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the characteristics of residential
property insurance and its regulation. In section 3, we propose a model to consider the tradeoffs
in a multi-line insurance company, offering bundled catastrophic coverage, between the benefits of
spatial economies in marketing and distribution of insurance products and the increased capital
costs for catastrophic lines of correlated risks. This basic model serves as the motivation for an
empirical analysis in section 4 of the market for homeowners insurance in Florida. Section 5
applies this analysis to the issue of cross-subsidies (among lines and among rating territories) and
discusses the implications of other regulatory constraints. Section 6 offers preliminary conclusions
and discusses further research.
2. Supply of Catastrophe Insurance
A. Characteristics of Residential Property Insurance
Our analysis focuses on the market for homeowners insurance which is the type of insurance
most commonly used to cover residential properties. It is important to explain how homeowners
insurance policies are designed and how they address catastrophic perils to assess their supply and2 An owner occupying a multi-unit structure might purchase a homeowners policy that would cover the entire
structure and the contents of the owner s particular unit as well as the owner s liability exposure. Alternatively, an
owner-occupant of a multi-unit structure may purchase a dwelling fire insurance policy to cover the structure. Renters
of the other units may purchase a renters  policy (HO-4) that covers the contents of their unit and their liability
exposure. Owners of condominium units also may purchase coverage (HO-6) for their contents, the interior features
of their unit, and their liability exposure.
3Most of the earthquake insurance sold in California currently is provided through the California Earthquake
Authority(CEA), established in 1996 to relieve pressure on private insurers. The CEA sells a “mini-policy” with a
larger deductible and more limited coverage of external structures than conventional earthquake insurance policies.
Some insurers offer “wrap-around” coverage to supplement the mini-policy and a few have begun to offer  earthquake
policies that compete with the CEA. California represents a special situation in that a 1988 law requires insurers to
offer earthquake coverage if they sell homeowners insurance (see Roth, 1998). 
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demand characteristics. Homeowners multiperil insurance packages several different coverages for
residential structures and their contents and inhabitants (Rejda, 1998). The perils covered typically
include fire, windstorm, hail, riot, lightning, explosion, theft, malicious mischief, as well as personal
liability. Homeowners multiperil coverage is confined to residential structures, including multi-unit
structures (2-4 units), where the owner occupies one of the units.
2
There are several different forms of homeowners multiperil coverage that differ in terms of
the perils covered and the basis for loss replacement (e.g., actual cash value, market value, or
replacement cost).  Also, depending on the state and company, certain coverages may be included
or specifically excluded in a specific policy form and special riders may be included to provide
additional coverage in a specific contract. For example, in coastal areas of states such as Florida
subject to hurricanes and tropical storms, the typical homeowners’ policy may exclude damage by
windstorm which is insured by separate state windstorm/beach pools. In states with significant
earthquake risk, earthquake coverage will be typically sold separately or as a special endorsement.
3.
The flood peril (including flooding associated with hurricanes) is insured through a separate policy
offered through the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
The major innovation of the homeowners multi peril policy (which emerged in the 1960s)-5-
was the packaging of liability and non-liability perils and providing broader coverage that
previously had to be purchased in separate policies and policy riders. The concept of bundling
perils and broadening coverage has driven product development over the last three decades, but
the catastrophic risk problem may prompt insurers to rethink this strategy. At the same time,
consumer attitudes and regulatory restrictions may impede insurers’ efforts to restructure
homeowners insurance policies, such as the unbundling of the wind peril (in the absence of state
windstorm pools).
It is still possible to purchase a more limited dwelling fire policy to cover a residential
structure against the major non-liability perils, including windstorms, with or without extended
coverage for contents and less significant non-liability perils. Dwelling fire policies are less
common and generally represent a small portion of insured homes. Hence, our data and analysis
focus on homeowners multiperil insurance.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that the contract offered by insurers conforms to the
provisions of the standard HO-3 homeowners policy as developed by the Insurance Services
Office (ISO). This is the predominant homeowners policy form purchased by consumers and
insurers’ HO-3 policies tend to closely resemble the ISO standard form. The standard HO-3
policy provides replacement cost coverage on the insured dwelling (Dwelling Coverage A) and
other detached structures (Coverage B) and actual cash value coverage on contents (Coverage
C). Policy limits for other detached structures and contents are based on the dwelling coverage
(A) policy limit. The other structures limit is 10 percent of the Coverage A limit and the contents
limit is 50 percent of the Coverage A limit. Insureds are encouraged to purchase a dwelling
coverage limit equal to 80-100 percent of the replacement cost of their dwelling. If insureds
purchase less than 80 percent coverage, then insurers may settle partial losses on a pro-rata basis4This kind of constraint is typically implemented through regulatory disapproval of the overall rate level
increases filed by insurers. For example, an insurer may file for a 10 percent rate level increase, but regulators will only
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based on the ratio of the actual policy limit to the 80 percent limit.
B. Regulatory Constraints
Insurers and insurance market are regulated primarily at the state level (Klein, 1998). The
federal government has not intervened in the regulation of homeowners insurance in any meaningful
way. Hence, the regulations governing homeowners insurance transactions are set by the individual
state legislatures and insurance commissioners, with legal disputes generally adjudicated by state
courts. Regulatory policies vary among states based on market conditions, differing regulatory
philosophies and political factors.
Florida is subject to the greatest risk of hurricanes and its homeowners insurance market
has suffered the greatest pressure because of this high hurricane risk (Lecomte and Gahagan,
1998). Florida’s homeowners insurance market began to experience severe problems following
Hurricane Andrew which caused an estimated $14.5 billion in insured losses. Experts estimate
that had Hurricane Andrew passed through Miami, insured losses would be in the area of $50
billion. A more severe storm striking Miami could generate insured losses of approximately $80
billion (RMS/ISO, 1995). Other coastal areas of Florida with significant economic development
also would experience huge losses if struck by a severe hurricane. Consequently, many insurers
have sought to raise their rates and decrease their exposures in high-risk areas of Florida.
This prompted the Florida legislature and insurance commissioner to impose the most
binding constraints on insurers of any state (Lecomte and Gahagan, 1998). Florida has
constrained insurers’ attempts to raise rates and reduce their exposures. Pricing constraints have
taken two forms. One is a ceiling on the overall rate level that insurers can charge.
4 The second isapprove a 5 percent increase. To meet this constraint, an insurer must adjust its rating structure, i.e., all of its rates
proportionately, to produce the approved rate level change.
5 See “Residual Market Crisis Looms in Florida”, National Underwriter, January 16, 1996, for a review of the current
status of these mechanisms.
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a constraint on insurers’ rate structures, i.e., territorial rating factors or differences in rates among
various geographic areas of the state. This latter constraint is significant because the expected loss
for a given property can vary widely depending on its proximity to the coast where the force of
hurricanes is most severe. Regulators have compressed rate differentials between high and low
risk areas in attempt to keep rates in high-risk areas more “affordable”. Insurers have been
permitted to increase their rates to some degree, but they contend (with considerable support)
that they have not been allowed to raise rates to the level necessary to adequately reflect the risk
of loss, particularly in coastal areas (Muslin, 1996).  We examine this question briefly in Section 5
below.
Ironically, rating constraints have conflicted with state officials’ attempts to preserve the
availability of coverage. After Hurricane Andrew, the legislature enacted a moratorium on policy
cancellations and non-renewals, which is still in effect. Hence, unless insurers negotiate a special
exemption with the insurance department, they can only shed exposures through cancellations and
non-renewals instigated by insureds. As a result, it appears that many insurers have been forced to
retain a higher number of exposures in high-risk areas than they would choose to in the absence of
regulatory constraints. 
Of course, some homeowners must still find coverage if they purchase a home or have to
cancel or non-renew their existing policy. This has caused Florida’s two residual market
mechanisms to swell and complicate the management and financing of catastrophic risk.
5 The
Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (FRPCJUA) provides-8-
coverage for homeowners unable to obtain coverage in the voluntary market. It grew to 600,000
policies (approximately 30 percent of all policies) after Hurricane Andrew. Its volume has since
decreased to approximately 240,000 policies as some insurers with limited hurricane risk and new
companies have taken policies out of the facility with financial incentives. However, the facility
has retained a high concentration of policies in coastal areas. Also, the facility imposes risk on
insurers, as any deficit it incurs would be assessed proportionately against insurers based on their
voluntary market shares. This has a detrimental effect on insurers’ willingness to write policies in
the voluntary market.
A second mechanism, the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association (FWUA), has
assumed the wind risk for many homes in coastal areas of Florida. Insurers are allowed to transfer
the wind portion of policies they write to the FWUA in designated coastal areas. Participating
insurers share premiums and losses through the pool and any deficits are assessed against the
voluntary market. The FWUA currently has 500,000 members (insureds). While this mechanism
has made it easier for insurers to retain their coverage of non-wind perils, its financial structure
presents problems similar to those posed by the FRPCJUA. The FWUA’s revenues and funds
would not be sufficient to cover losses from a severe hurricane.
The high risk concentration and underfunding of these two facilities has prompted significant
legislative and industry concern. Indeed, these facilities have generated $250 million in deficits and
voluntary market assessments since 1995, a period devoid of severe wind losses. This reflects the tip
of the iceberg relative to the huge deficits and assessments that would be caused by larger events
under the current residual market structure. Legislators face a dilemma in terms of allocating the risk
and costs borne by facility insureds and voluntary market insureds.
Florida’s catastrophe reinsurance facility and insolvency guaranty fund impose additional risk-9-
on insureds, insurers and the public. In 1993, Florida established the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe
Fund (FHCF) to allow insurers to transfer a portion of their catastrophic risk in Florida (see Lecomte
and Gahagan, 1998). The Fund will reimburse a portion of insurers’ losses from a severe hurricane.
It is funded by premiums paid by insurers that write policies on personal and commercial residential
properties based on insurers’ property exposures. An important provision limits the Fund’s obligation
to pay losses to the sum of its assets and borrowing capacity. At the end of 1997, the Fund was
estimated to have a total capacity of $8 billion; $2 billion in cash and $6 billion in borrowing capacity.
Borrowed funds will be raised through the issuance of bonds to be repaid through a 4 percent
assessment on all property-casualty insurance premiums in the state, excluding workers
compensation. If the Fund lacks sufficient funds to pay all losses from a hurricane, each insurer will
be reimbursed on a pro-rata basis from the funds available according to its share of the premiums paid
into the fund for that contract year. Hence, the potential for special assessments as well as partial
reimbursement for catastrophic losses imposes residual risk on insurers.
Like other states, Florida also has an insolvency guaranty fund that is intended to cover the
claims obligations of insolvent insurers. The guaranty fund is important because it could experience
severe stress if a large number of insurers became insolvent because of a catastrophe. The guaranty
fund is supported by assessments on property-casualty insurance premiums in the state that are limited
to 2 percent annually. Hurricane Andrew directly caused nine insolvencies and the resulting demands
on the guaranty fund exceeded its capacity. The guaranty fund was forced to fully exercise its 2
percent assessment authority and the legislature authorized it to assess an additional 2 percent to
repay funds borrowed to cover its capacity shortfall. The fund ultimately paid off its debts in 1997.
Interestingly, the fund’s assessments caused a tenth insurer to become insolvent. The experience from
Hurricane Andrew reflects the guaranty fund’s vulnerability to catastrophes and the potential pass--10-
through of insolvent insurers’ obligations and risk to other insurers.
3. Modeling the Market for Catastrophic Insurance
This section develops a model to illustrate the tradeoffs for insurers in a market like the Florida
homeowners market where there may be significant regulatory frictions preventing optimal
adjustment of the insurers’ portfolios.  We formulate a solvency-constrained, expected profit
maximizing insurer model for a specific insurer.  The model captures several tradeoffs.  The level
of the solvency constraint itself reflects the insurer’s appetite for risk and, in particular, the
tradeoff between the costs of increased reserves and the franchise value of the firm going forward,
which is put at risk under insolvency.  For any specific target level of insolvency probability,
maximizing expected returns from a given equity base implies that the insurer will attempt to
market its risk coverage to a geographically diversified portfolio of risks. On the other hand, scale
economies in marketing, distribution and claims processing, may drive the company to market
more intensively in some areas than in others, leading to increased (positive) correlation among
the risks in the insurer’s portfolio.  The model thus is intended to embody the interaction of
demand and marketing payoffs relative to the costs of the capital required to support the book of
business chosen by the insurer.   These tradeoffs will be further complicated if regulators
contravene adequate rates or cause cross-subsidies through rate compression.  
The Solvency-Constrained Insurer’s Problem
Fix attention on a particular insurer in a specified region, e.g., the State of Florida. 
Denote by x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) the vector of exposures for the insurer, where x i is the insurer’s
exposure in insurance zone i in the region.  In keeping with the notion that the insurance market is
workably competitive, we assume that the firm is a price-taker in the market, with price in zone i-11-





Ri(xi) & Mi(xi) & L
((x,A,K) & rK
(1)
per unit of exposure given by pi.  Let L i(xi) be the random variable representing losses in zone i
and let L(x) = L1(x1) + L2(x2) + ... + Ln(xn) denote total losses.  Losses in different zones may be
correlated since the same “event” could create losses in more than one zone.  Losses to different
properties within a zone are correlated for the same reason.   These losses may arise from
catastrophe lines of business or from other lines.  We return below to the interaction effects of
multi-peril coverages.
Denote by ?(x, A, K) the expected profits for the insurer for a typical year, where A are
the assets of the insurer supporting the business x and K is additional risk-bearing capital
described in more detail below.   We write expected profits as:
where 
Ri(xi) = Annual revenue from zone i = pixi
Mi(xi) = Marketing, Sales and Distribution (annual) Expenses for zone i
L
¯ *(x, A, K) =  E{Min [L(x), (R(x) - M(x) + (1-r)K + A)]} = Expected annual losses from
all zones, truncated at the insolvency point L = R(x) - M(x) + (1-r)K + A.
r K =  Payments to capital providers for K 
Marketing expenses Mi will depend on company organizational variables such as its
distribution strategy.  We will think of K as reinsurance, but K could also be in the form of zero-
coupon bonds.  The important assumption we make about K is that the “premium” (or interest in
the case of bonds) is prepaid, before losses are known, so that (1-r)K is actually available to pay-12-
losses if K units of reinsurance are purchased.  The “shareholder equity” A that the insurer puts at
risk may influence the rate r or the amount of reinsurance K obtainable.  We take A and r as fixed
here and assume that K is set to just satisfy a solvency constraint, specified below.   Once A and K
are exhausted, i.e., insolvency occurs, the insurer bears no further responsibilities for losses; losses
are accounted for in the expected profit function only up to the point of insolvency.   Thus, in the
spirit of Herring and Vankudre (1987) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990), based on transactions
costs of insolvency and the franchise value of the firm going forward, solvency constraints may be
viewed as an endogenous outcome of the options value of continued operations.  The price of the
option in this case is the differential returns to capital devoted to the insurance business at the
margin rather than to other market opportunities.   An alternative and equivalent approach to
making insolvency probabilities endogenous, driven by an exogenously specified franchise value
of the firm going forward, is to take the level of insolvency probability as exogenous.  This is the
approach we take here.  In the language of Herring and Vankudre (1987), Go-for-broke or
gambling behavior corresponds to relatively high values of insolvency probability (reflecting for
such firms low values of anticipated growth opportunities which cannot be converted to cash if
insolvency occurs).   Such behavior is to be contrasted with that of insurers with long-run profit
prospects who would choose lower values of target insolvency  probabilities reflecting the higher
franchise of the firm going forward. 
These considerations lead to model in which the insurer chooses its book of business x to
maximize ?(x, A, K) subject to a solvency constraint based on a probable maximum loss (PML). 
This requires that underlying reserves and reinsurance A + (1-r)K be set large enough to avoid
financial distress with a probability exceeding 1 -  ?, where ? represents the worst case or PML
probability.  Formally, we have the following requirement:-13-
Pr6L(x) > R(x) & M(x) % (1&r)K % A> ’ 1 & F[R(x) & M(x) % (1&r)K % A; x] # ? (2)
F(S(x,?); x) ’ 1 & ? (3)
Maximize
x$0,K$0
6R(x) & M(x) & L
((x,A,K) & rK * R(x) & M(x) % (1&r)K %A $ S(x,?)> (4)
where F(L; x) = Pr{L(x) # L} is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the total loss
distribution.  The import of (2) is the following.  The probability that the insurer will be unable to
cover losses (from revenues R(x) and surplus (1-r)K + A) of its policyholders after paying
marketing expenses M(x) is no greater than the prespecified insolvency probability  ?.   The
problem of interest is to choose x to maximize (1) subject to (2).  It will be convenient to
reformulate this problem by defining the “net surplus function” S(x, ?) as the unique solution to
Using (3), we can state the problem of  maximizing expected profits subject to the solvency
constraint (2) succinctly as:
Intuitively, S(x, ?) is the amount of capital from all sources required to assure that the probability
the insurer’s losses in a given period exceed S will be no greater than ?.  Alternatively, S(x, ?)
specifies the amount of surplus required to avoid financial distress with probability 1-?.   The net
surplus S(x, ?) is increasing in both expected losses and the variance of total losses.  To the extent
that losses across zones are positively correlated, the variance in total losses will increase further. 
Meeting the solvency constraint (2) means putting enough premium revenue and capital behind
the portfolio to assure assets of S(x, ?) to meet losses.  The characteristics of the portfolio are
clearly important in determining S(x, ?)-- the more highly correlated they are, the larger the
required surplus.                 6   The Lagrangean for the optimization problem in (4) is just ￿(x, ?) = [R(x) - M(x) - L
¯*(x,A,K) - rK] +
?[R(x) - M(x) + (1-r)K + A  - S(x, ?)].  Taking derivatives and simplifying leads directly to (5).
7 By positive interdependence, we mean that if exposures y (additional insured properties) are added to a book
of business x, then Pr{L(x+y) = L(x) + L(y) # L * L(y) = R} is non-decreasing in R.  By definition of the net surplus
function S, we have Pr{L(x+y) # S(x+y, ?)} = Pr{L(x) # S(x, ?)} = 1-?, so that S(x+y, ?) and S(x, ?) are the (1-?)th
upper fractile of the cdf of L(x+y) and L(x) respectively.   Given the positive interdependence between L(x) and L(y),
the asserted monotonicity states that the difference between this fractile and the mean of the distribution is increasing
as exposures increase.  The most intuitive example of this is the normal distribution.  In this case, S(x+y, ?) =
E{L(x+y)} + k(?)s(L(x+y)), so that S(x+y, ?) - E{L(x+y)} = k(?)s(L(x+y)) which is clearly increasing in y for any
given x; i.e., since L(x) and L(y) are not negatively correlated, as more exposures are added the variance of the loss











; i ’ 1,2,...,n (5)
Associating the shadow price ? $ 0 with the constraint in (4), we obtain the following
first-order conditions (FOCs) for optimal exposures x for the insurer’s problem
6:
By the defintion of L
¯ *(x, A, K), one readily verifies that ML
¯ *(x, A, K)/MK = (1-r)?.  Thus,
the FOC for optimal capital K* yields ? =? +  r/(1-r), so that ?/(1+?) = [?(1-r) + r]/[?(1-r) + 1] in
(5).   Denote this quantity ß(r, ?) = ?/(1+?).  Note that ß(r, ?) 6 r as ? 6 0.  Given our assumption
that A is fixed, the optimal K* will be set to just achieve equality in (2) at the x* determined by
(5). 
Under regularity assumptions on the concavity and smoothness of the profit function,
decreasing the required level of insolvency probability ? will, as expected, reduce the optimal
book of business everywhere.   To see this, assume that the expected profit function is concave
for x > 0, although there may be discontinuities at xi = 0, resulting for example from the fixed
costs of setting up infrastructure to market in zone i.  Assuming exposures give rise to losses
which are positively interdependent, decreasing ? will increase the magnitude of the quantity in
brackets in (5).












; i ’ 1,2,...,n (6)
implies that the book of business xi will be reduced in each zone for which xi > 0 obtains in the
unconstrained expected profit maximizing solution.   In fact, the book of business will be scaled
down in each zone to a level which depends on how sensitive increases in net surplus over
expected losses are to changes in exposure in the zone.   This, in turn, will depend on the degree
of correlation of the losses within zone i to intrazonal and interzonal losses.  Intuitively, the higher
the correlation, the larger the impact on the right hand tail of the joint distribution of L(x) and the
higher the marginal net surplus requirements MS(x, ?)/Mxi over ML
¯*(x, A, K)/Mxi. 
Price Regulation
Regulation interacts with the above analysis in several ways, including determination of
required solvency levels (1-?), price and profit constraints, underwriting constraints, and entry and
exit constraints (see Klein, 1998).  All of these can be important in shaping the market outcome
for catastrophe insurance.  We discuss only the effects of price constraints here, leaving to a
discussion below the effects of other regulatory constraints.  
To model the effects of price constraints, assume the regulator imposes constraints of the
form pi # p
¯
i , i = 1, 2, ..., n.   From (5), there will be a direct effect of these price ceilings on the
optimal coverages xi* the insurer can offer in zone i.  Indeed, rewriting (5) to separate the
marginal effects of revenue and marketing costs, we obtain:
Assuming that the right-hand side of (6) is increasing in x i, it is clear that decreases in the
allowed price pi must result in decreases in coverage in zone i.  The erosion in profits implied by
pricing constraints will be both the direct effects through price ceilings and the indirect effects8 Indeed, let us think of the x vector above as having two entries for each actual insurance zone, the first being
for non-cat exposures and the second for cat exposures in the same zone, and let us imagine a scenario in which there
are demand synergies from offering multi-peril (bundled) coverages. In the case of bundled products (where marketing
of cat and non-cat perils occurs jointly, e.g., though a multi-peril homeowners policy), increases in exposure would
be pursued until net revenues from the bundled coverage were equilibrated at the margin against additional marketing
and surplus costs, as required by (6).   That is to say, one would simply reinterpret (6) as the price for the bundled
coverage (with x being the sum of both components of exposure).  If  regulatory policy contravenes adequate rates for
the cat coverage, insurers might still issue bundled policies that satisfy the above constraint on exposures, but in this
case the non-cat revenues would be cross-subsidizing the cat risks.  Clearly, absent regulatory restrictions or demand
synergies, competition would assure the collapse of the market for catastrophe coverage when rates are inadequate.
Absent the assured hostage of earnings from the non-cat coverage, insurers would be forced to exit the cat market in
these inadequate rate zones.  We should note that basic regulatory practice at this point generally prohibits the
unbundling of cat and non-cat protection, underlining the potential for cross-subsidies in the manner described.  The
exception to this, as discussed above, is where an insurer can lay off hurricane risks to wind pools, maintaining bundled
coverage for their policy holders, but effectively unbundling their exposures.
9 Given our interest in the tail events driving insolvency, we refer to this example as “The Tail of Two Cities”.
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through decreased contributions from zone i to the company’s overall net surplus requirements. 
A possible strategy for the insurer would be exit from the high risk, price-regulated zones, but this
(as we note in Section 4 below) may be further constrained by the regulator.
8
Two-Zone Example
To make the above analysis more concrete, we briefly consider an example in which there
are only two zones, i = 1,2.
9   We are interested in the interacting effects of correlated demand on
the net surplus and on possible economies of scale in marketing on total expenses at the solvency
constrained optimal solution.  Let the functions R, M and L be specified as follows:
Ri(xi) = pixi
Mi(xi) = Fi d(xi) + bixi









where hi > 0 are constants and  k(?) is decreasing in ?.  The function S(x, ?) is motivated by the
fractiles of the normal distribution together with an assumption that the coefficient of variation of




aixi & Fid(xi) & bix
2
i & rK (7)







1/2 ; i ’ 1, 2 (8)
L
¯*(x) ￿ L
¯(x) and ß(r, ?) ￿ r.  Then, defining ai = pi - ci, and assuming ai > 0, expected profits can
be expressed as
If xi > 0, then substituting the above expressions in the first-order condition (5) implies that 
with the optimal capital K* set to just achieve equality in (2) at the x* determined by (8).  Serving
zone i at exposure levels xi* would be optimal if sufficient expected profits are generated in zone i
at this solution to balance the fixed cost F i of establishing marketing infrastructure in zone i.  
Otherwise, the insurer will pull out of zone i (i.e., set xi = 0). 
Consider the effect of insolvency constraints for this case.  From (8) and a i = pi - ci, if xi >
0 at optimum then reducing pi will reduce the right-side of (8).  But the right-hand side of (8) is
easily shown to be increasing in xi.  Thus, the optimal solution to (8) decreases if the regulated
rate ceiling p
¯
i is decreased.  If the rate ceiling p
¯
i for is set low enough, and absent exit restrictions,
the fixed cost Fi of infrastructure for zone i would not be recovered and the insurer would exit
zone i altogether.   For the above model, exit restrictions in the form of constraints x i$ xi (i.e.,
floors, perhaps based on historical exposure levels) would have the direct effect of suppressing
profits from operations in zone i and the indirect effect of suppressing coverage in other zones
since the profits from zone i are used in part to provide the net surplus required for overall
operations.  Thus, coupling exit restrictions with price ceilings would have the anticipated double-18-
impacts on the zones in which they applied and, through net surplus erosion, on overall coverage.
Summarizing the insights from this analysis, we see the following.  As the solvency
constraint becomes more stringent (i.e., as ? decreases in (2)) insurers facing no price or exit
restrictions will decrease their exposures.  How fast exposures xi will be reduced in each zone
depend on marginal marketing and distribution costs and the magnitude of net surplus required
over expected losses.  If xi falls far enough, a particular zone may fail to meet the ex ante profit
threshold for establishing marketing infrastructure, thus leading companies to be represented in
some zones and not others.   Profits and presence thus depend in essential ways on the structure
of spatially determined costs.  For example, it is well known (see Berger, Cummins and Weiss,
1997) that direct writers face cost structures with larger fixed costs F i and lower variable costs bi
than agency writers.    One consequence of this is that, for companies of equal size, we would
expect direct writers to exhibit higher variance in both their presence and their exposures across
zones than agency writers.  
In concluding this formal analysis, it will not have escaped the reader’s notice that the key
elements driving the structure of optimal insurance portfolios involve complex tradeoffs between
the drivers of net surplus required to assure solvency criteria are met, and the structure of
regulated prices across zones and marketing cost functions.  It is therefore not surprising, in light
of this complexity, that modeling companies have assumed such an important role in assisting
insurers in the evaluation of the profit and solvency impacts of their exposures.
4. Empirical Analysis of the Florida Homeowners Market
Based on the model developed in Section 3, we consider the demand and supply for
homeowners insurance, including coverage for hurricanes, in Florida. The detailed statistical data10 This could change if the internet becomes a preferred vehicle for at least some segment of the population
in obtaining its homeowner policies.  The internet would decouple much of the front end administration costs from
geographic factors.   Claims processing could still have some local economies of scale associate with it.  On the face
of it, internet marketing and sales would allow and promote greater diversification in exposures.   Notwithstanding
its transactions cost advantages, the market is still not very active in homeowners insurance, however, and we do not
consider it explicitly here.
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necessary for estimating supply and demand functions are not yet available.  However, we can
examine some preliminary data we have already obtained for Florida on insurers  homeowners
exposure and premiums, by county,  for the first quarter of 1998. These data provide some
intuitive corroboration for the tradeoffs suggested in Section 3 above.
The presence of economies of scale and spatial economies is reflected by how insurers
have distributed their business regionally and within the state of Florida. As discussed above, we
believe that there is a cascading series of spatial economies that vary with the specific functions
that insurers perform. Certain corporate functions can be efficiently conducted at an insurer’s
central office, such as high-level management and financial activities, regardless of its proximity to
the location of the insurer’s policies.  Certain other activities are most efficiently conducted at a
regional level. These functions might typically include marketing, underwriting, and claims
handling. Consequently, it is common for insurers to establish regional offices to conduct these
activities. The number and locations of an insurer’s regional offices will be influenced by the
volume of business it writes in different areas of the country. Additionally, the smaller the insurer,
the more likely it is to concentrate its business in fewer regions or states.
10
Finally, the costs of some activities are significantly affected by an insurer’s volume and
concentration of business in areas and communities within a state. These activities include the
services provided by insurance agents and on-site claims adjustment. Personal lines agents
typically operate within a certain defined territory sufficient to generate an adequate volume of
business to support their operation. Smaller geographic areas are easier to service in terms of-20-
face-to-face contacts with insureds and on-site claims adjustment. This induces insurers to
concentrate their marketing and sales in areas of a state where they can generate sufficient
business to efficiently support their agent force.  In effect, establishing the infrastructure to do
business in a given area requires a fixed investment, some of which is also sunk.  This gives rise to
the tradeoffs we discussed in Section 3.  
Note that the costs associated with local distribution and claims processing will vary by
type of distribution system.  In turn, the type of distribution system used by an insurer affects the
volume of business necessary to support its agents. An independent agent represents multiple
insurers so the amount of business he must write for any one insurer is less than that required to
support an exclusive agent. An exclusive agent represents only one insurer and that one insurer
must generate a sufficient volume of business to support the agent.  Hence, all else equal, insurers
utilizing exclusive agents would be expected to write a larger volume and concentration of
business within particular communities or areas of a state to support their agent force. However,
in reality, exclusive agent insurers tend to be very large to achieve the corporate economies of
scale necessary to support the higher fixed costs of its distribution system. The greater size of
direct writers may dominate their distribution of business within a state and result in greater
uniformity in their market shares among areas than that found for independent agency companies. 
Some indication of the significance of costs affected by scale and scope economies and
geographic concentration is provide by Table 4.1. Table 4.1 provides a breakdown of insurers’
homeowners insurance premiums, losses and expenses (by category). Several expense categories
are affected by spatial economies including allocated loss adjustment expense, unallocated loss
adjustment expense, commissions and brokerage fees, and other acquisition costs. Together, these
categories accounted for 33.7 percent of insurers’ direct premiums earned in 1997. 11 This phenomena is reflected in recent redlining lawsuits brought against homeowners insurers.
Statistical analysis by plaintiffs indicate that some insurers write relatively more business in suburban areas than in
inner-city areas.  The plaintiffs contend that this reflects unfair discrimination against urban areas by insurers.
However, insurers counter that the geographic distribution of their marketing efforts and business reflects the
opportunity to earn greater revenues and profits in suburban areas where household income levels and the amount
of insurance purchased are greater.
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Some costs are more difficult to quantify but are nonetheless important in influencing
insurers’ market strategies. For example, the cost of information insurers utilizing exclusive agents
would be expected to write a larger volume and concentration of business within particular
communities or areas of a state to support their agent force.  The cost of information also would
be expected to influence insurers’ geographic volume and concentration of business. The
information used by insurers to assess risk, price their products, make underwriting decisions, and
adjust claims has a geographic component. Certain risk factors vary by region, state and areas
within a state. Insurers must incur certain fixed costs to acquire this information which can be
spread more broadly as an insurer’s volume of business increases within a geographic area.
Additionally, some information can only be acquired by writing policies within a given area.
Finally, the greater the volume of exposures that an insurer has in an area, the more statistically
credible are the data generated by these policies. This enables an insurer to develop a competitive
edge in terms of pricing and underwriting selection.
Another factor that contributes to insurers’ geographic concentration is their tendency to
differentiate themselves in terms of their pricing, underwriting stringency, quality of service and
target markets. For example, some insurers tend to specialize in rural or suburban areas, and
others tend to be more dominant in urban areas. Companies also differentiate themselves in terms
of writing “preferred risks” (that pass the most stringent underwriting standards), “standard risks”
and “non-standard risks”. Additionally, some insurers target high-income households while others
do not make such a distinction or tend to write more middle and low-income households.
12  As-22-
the economic and demographic characteristics of households tend to vary geographically, this
encourages geographic concentration by insurers.
Insurers’ spatial economies at various levels interact in influencing the volume of business
that they write in specific communities. Insurers can only write policies where homes are located.
In order to achieve regional cost efficiencies, an insurer must write business in at least some of the
populated areas of a region. For example, an insurer with a concentration in the Southeast may
find it necessary to write a significant number of policies in communities along the coast where
the majority of people live.
Evidence of spatial economies within a state is presented in Table 4.2. Table 4.2 provides
summary statistics on the variation in insurers  homeowners market shares (based on direct premiums
written) among counties within Florida. This variation is measured by a coefficient of variation (COV)
calculated for each insurer. A higher COV indicates that an insurer’s business is less uniformly
distributed or diversified among counties in relation to the total market in each county. The 231
insurers writing homeowners insurance in Florida were ranked by their COV and divided into
quartiles. Table 4.2 indicates that there is considerable variation among each insurer’s county market
shares. The maximum COV values for the quartiles are 1.3, 2.1, 3.7, and 8.2. The differences in
insurer characteristics among quartiles suggest that greater variation in county market shares is
associated with larger company size (total countrywide direct premiums written), a larger share of
the entire state market, and the use of an independent agency system.
Figures 4.1(a)-4.1(d) provide a stylized picture of the geographic concentration of four
insurers, identified as Companies A, B, C and D. The companies are not identified by name but all
are among the top 20 writers of homeowners insurance in the state. Each figure maps an insurer s
relative market penetration by county. The maps divide Florida counties into five categories reflecting-23-
the range of each insurer’s market shares. Note, the categorization of counties for each insurer is
specific to its range of market shares among all counties. Hence, the maps demonstrate how these
four insurers have concentrated their market penetration in various areas of the state. In some
counties, an insurer’s market share will be minimal or zero, while in others it will be much higher. The
maps also indicate some geographic contiguity in the distribution of insurers’ county market shares.
In other words, for a given insurer, counties where it has a high market share will tend to be more
geographically proximate and the same will be true for counties where it has a relatively low market
share.
Table 4.3 explores the implications of some insurers’ high number of exposures in the three
coastal counties in the vicinity of the Miami metropolitan area: Broward, Dade and Palm Beach
counties. The dollar amount of exposures for these counties was summed for each insurer and
compared to its total policyholder surplus. Insurers with a ratio of exposures to surplus greater than
100 percent are shown in Table 4.3, ranked in descending order of this ratio. The ratio of exposures
to surplus plus Florida homeowners premiums also was calculated and shown for each insurer. The
names of insurers are excluded from the table.
Caution should be exercised in reviewing these results. We did not have information on
insurers’ catastrophe reinsurance arrangements so we could not calculate insurers net exposure to
losses from a hurricane striking the Miami area. Still, the data do show that some insurers’ Miami-
area exposures are high relative to their surplus. For example, 22 insurers’ Miami exposures were
more than 10 times the amount of their surplus. Seventy insurers had exposure/surplus ratios greater
than 100 percent. The insurers vary greatly in size and in terms of their overall Florida homeowners
premiums. There are some large insurers among the companies with high ratios. Also, newer
companies tend to predominate among the companies with the highest ratios. Hopefully, many of-24-
these companies are protected by catastrophe reinsurance as suggested by low net retention ratios.
However, there is still cause for concern that companies that did not have adequate reinsurance could
experience severe financial difficulty if a severe hurricane struck the Miami area because of their
relatively high amount of exposures in this area.
Table 4.4 presents the results of a multiple regression analysis of some of the determinants
of the degree of variation in insurers  market shares across Florida counties. The dependent variable
in this analysis is an insurer’s market share COV as calculated for Table 4.2.  Several explanatory
variables were included in the regression equation. SIZE is the log of an insurer s countrywide direct
premium written, which is expected to have a negative effect on geographic variation. FLDPW is the
log of an insurer s homeowners direct premiums written in Florida, which is also expected to have
a negative effect on variation. MUTUAL is a dummy variable equal to one if an insurer is a mutual
company. Being a mutual may have a positive effect on variation of mutual companies tend certain
markets that are most consistent with their base of policyholder-members.
DIRECT is a dummy variable equal to one if an insurer is a direct writer. This serves as proxy
for identifying exclusive agent companies. The source of this information does not distinguish
between companies that market insurance through the mail or over the phone from insurers that use
exclusive agents. However, most companies identified as direct writers use exclusive agents. As
discussed above, all else equal, exclusive agent companies would be expected to have greater market
variation (than independent agency companies) because of their greater fixed costs in establishing and
maintaining business in a particular area. However, as noted and indicated by Table 4.2, the reality
may be that overall economies of scale dominate direct writers’ variation in market shares because
of their large size.
YEARS is the number of years an insurer has been in business.   Older  insurers would be-25-
expected to have less market variation given their ability to spread fixed costs over time and gradually
expand their penetration into new areas. Additionally, several companies have been formed to write
Florida homeowners insurance and take policies out of the FLRPCJUA which tend to be concentrated
along coastal areas. Hence, YEARS is expected to be negatively associated with market variation.
NETRET is the percentage of gross premiums written that an insurer retains and does not
cede to another insurer. An insurer that cedes more of its premiums may be able to afford greater
concentration of its business in certain areas without jeopardizing its solvency.
EXPR is an insurer’s overall expense ratio. Greater variation in market shares would be
expected to be associated with lower expense ratios because of the greater efficiencies provided by
market concentration.
The regression model tested was marginally significant with an r-squared of .117 and F-
statistic of 3.794. Of the explanatory variables, only FLDPW, DIRECT and NETRET were
statistically significant at a 5 percent confidence level. The coefficients for FLDPW and NETRET
carried their expected signs, supporting the hypotheses that a smaller Florida market share and the
greater use of reinsurance are positively associated with greater variation in county market shares.
However, the coefficient for DIRECT was negative, consistent with results in Table 4.2 but counter
to the prediction that direct writing will be associated with greater market share variation. Our
explanation for this result is direct writers’ large size that allows them to achieve more uniform
market shares across a state.
In sum, this preliminary review of empirical data tends to support the view that many
insurers are not geographically diversified within Florida, but rather tend to have much higher
concentrations of business in some areas than others. The uneven distribution of insurers’
exposures goes beyond what would be driven the distribution of homes in the state. The fact that-26-
insurers market shares vary greatly among counties indicates that other factors drive insurers to
concentrate their business even further in certain areas. We believe that cost and competitive
considerations underlie this phenomena. Further, regulatory policies impede attempts by insurers
to diversify their business in response to the greater understanding of catastrophe risk following
Hurricane Andrew. The effects of these regulatory constraints are discussed below.
5. Regulation and Cross-Subsidies
As described in Section 2, states impose a number of regulatory constraints on insurers,
particularly states that are experiencing insurance market problems due to catastrophic risk. Two
types of constraints are especially relevant to the subject of this paper: 1) constraints on insurers’
overall rate level and price differences between insureds with different levels of risk; and 2)
constraints on insurers’ ability to terminate policies or limit their exposures in high-risk areas.
Depending on how they are enforced, these constraints can interact in such a way as to create
cross subsidies between low and high risk areas as well increase insurers’ vulnerability to
insolvency because of rate inadequacy and an excessive concentration of exposures in high-risk
areas.  How insurers and insureds respond to and are affected by such regulatory constraints
depends on several factors, as discussed below.
A key issue of interest is the existence and magnitude of cross subsidies in the
homeowners market.  We define cross subsidies as differences between loss costs and prices.
Then, focusing on the catastrophic coverage in the Florida homeowners market, we present
preliminary results on the existence of cross subsidies and we discuss their likely origin in the
interaction between regulation and the supply-demand model of insurance presented earlier. The
argument is roughly this. Regulation distorts pricing in two ways. The direct effect is simply to-27-
undermine the equality between price and expense-adjusted loss costs. The indirect effect is to
distort entry and exit decisions in specific territories within the state, as described in Section 3. 
Estimating the magnitude and direction of these two distortions will be the focus of this section. 
In the absence of any regulatory constraints on insurers’ adjustments in their portfolio of
policies, regulatory suppression of rates will discourage insurers from writing policies, all else
equal.  Insurers will be disinclined to provide coverage to any homeowner for who they cannot
charge an adequate risk-adjusted price.  Depending on the severity of the rate inadequacy,
insurers may delay policy terminations if they believe that rating constraints are temporary. 
Because of the fixed costs incurred in selling policies and earning the goodwill of policyholders,
insurers will be reluctant to terminate policies if they believe that these fixed costs will exceed
their losses from rate inadequacy.  If the rate inadequacy is most severe for high-risk insureds,
insurers will tend to terminate these insureds first and continue to terminate or non-renew policies
as the prospects for regulatory relief dim.  This will undermine regulatory efforts to suppress rates
and impose cross subsidies.
In an effort to maintain the availability of coverage, regulators may impose restrictions on
insurers’ ability to terminate or non-renew policies, as they have done in Florida.  To the extent
regulators are successful in preventing policy terminations, they may be able to achieve cross
subsidies from insurers and low-risk insureds to high-risk insureds, at least for a period of time. 
This regulatory policy also will impede insurers’ ability to reduce their exposures in high-risk
areas to a safe level, i.e., a level consistent with their target probability of ruin.  However, insurers
will still be dissuaded from entering areas and writing new business at inadequate rates.  Insurers
also will be forced to exit a state altogether if severe rate suppression continues indefinitely or if
they are unable to achieve and maintain a “safe” diversification of exposures within the state.-28-
There is strong evidence that Florida has sought to suppress rate levels and compress rate
structures for homeowners insurance.  This is revealed by Figure 5.1 which shows the difference
between indicated loss costs and approved loss costs filed by the Insurance Services Office.  As
can be seen in this figure, the degree of rate inadequacy is higher for coastal rating territories
where catastrophic risk is greatest.  We would expect that regulatory treatment of individual
insurer rate filings would reveal the same kind of pattern.
The extent to which these rating constraints actually result in cross subsidies depends on
the effect of underwriting constraints and regulators’ ability to prevent insurers from
circumventing the rating constraints.  We have not yet analyzed data that bears on this question,
but there is reason to believe that the rating constraints have imposed some cross subsidy as well
as caused other market distortions.  Insurers in Florida have not been successful in obtaining
regulatory approval to decrease their exposures in high-risk areas to the extent they have
requested.  At the same time, homeowners in high-risk areas that have had their policies
terminated or otherwise needed to buy a new policy, have not been able to purchase coverage in
the voluntary market.  This has forced Florida’s two residual market facilities to absorb these
policyholders.  
6. Conclusions and Further Research
The problem of catastrophic risk is exacerbated by the uneven geographic distribution of
insurers' exposures. Insurers could significantly reduce their potential for correlated losses from a
catastrophe by restructuring their portfolios to maximize the geographic diversification of their
exposures. However, there are several reasons why this strategy would not be efficient nor realistic.
First, homes are not evenly distributed across the country, but rather are concentrated along the east,-29-
southern and west coasts that are exposed to hurricanes and earthquakes. Second, because of spatial
economies, a given insurer tends to concentrate its business in certain geographic areas, causing its
market share to vary widely among geographic areas. This further contributes to a lack of geographic
diversification. In the absence of any regulatory constraints, the optimal geographic structure of an
insurer's portfolio depends on the tradeoffs between spatial economies, the risk of correlated losses
and the cost of risk transfer through reinsurance and other financial mechanisms.
Regulation imposes further constraints on insurers' ability to achieve an optimal geographic
distribution of exposures. In high-risk states, such as Florida, regulators have placed restrictions on
insurers' rates and ability to terminate policies in coastal areas vulnerable to hurricanes. Rate
suppression prevents insurers from charging prices adequate to cover the cost of insuring high-risk
properties. This increases insurers' risk of insolvency and undermines their ability to purchase
adequate reinsurance to cover their catastrophic risk. Underwriting constraints also impede insurers'
ability to restructure their risk portfolios to decrease their concentration of exposures in high-risk
areas and lessen their catastrophic risk.
The design of optimal private and public strategies to manage catastrophe risk must consider
the cost tradeoffs identified in this paper as well as the impact of regulatory constraints. This paper
is a first attempt to explore the nature of spatial economies in insurance and their implications for the
geographic distribution of insurers' exposures and vulnerability to catastrophic risk. The implications
of regulatory constraints, e.g., on pricing and underwriting, for decisions by insurers attempting to
manage these spatial economies are clearly central questions in the catastrophe insurance area. Our
work is preliminary and incomplete, but we establish the foundation for a line of research that will
ultimately explain insurers' strategies in structuring their risk portfolios and responding to regulatory
constraints in the market for catastrophe insurance.  A number of political economic puzzles may also13 The general "economic" theory of regulation, as articulated by Peltzman (1976), may provide some insights
here as the economic interests of coastal dwellers and developers are relatively concentrated compared to the more
diffuse economic interests of homeowners who bear the cross subsidy.
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emerge for further research, including why cross subsidies appear to exist from a large number of
inlanders to a smaller number of beach-front dwellers.
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Direct Premiums Written 27,373,559     
Direct Premiums Earned 26,633,249      100.0%
Dividends to Policyholders 101,319            0.4%
Incurred Losses 20,284,614      76.2%
Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense Incurred 1,004,440         3.8%
Unallocated Loss Adjustment Expense Incurred 2,186,639         8.2%
Commission & Brokerage Expense Incurred 3,913,586         14.7%
Taxes, Licenses, & Fees Incurred 687,193            2.6%
Other Acquisition, Field Supervision & Collection Expenses Incurred 1,861,243         7.0%
General Expenses Incurred 1,262,243         4.7%
Other Income Less Other Expenses 52,276              0.2%
Pre-Tax Profit or Loss (4,612,267)       -17.3%
Expenses Directly Affected by Spatial Economies 8,965,908                 33.7%
Source: Best's Aggregates and Averages 1997 (Insurance Expense Exhibit)
Homeowners Multiperil Insurance
Direct Premiums, Losses and Expenses
1997
Table 4.1Variable Ist 2nd 3rd 4th
Maximum Value 1.332363 2.115972 3.727885 8.198099
Percent Agency Cos 62.1% 81.0% 84.5% 89.5%
Direct Premiums Written 930,916          359,970              329,219          359,757         
Net Premiums Written 909,060          340,004              275,855          309,338         
Net Retention Ratio 58.60% 59.90% 57.30% 53.20%
Expense Ratio 28.70% 26.60% 35.00% 27.70%
Florida Market Share 1.76% 0.23% 0.11% 0.01%
Coefficient of Variation 0.98943 1.70621 2.80914 5.44064
Mean Values by COV Quartile
Florida Homeowners Insurance
Market Share by County by Company
Table 4.2RANK YEAR RATING DPW(000s) NPW(000s) RET(%) PHS(000s) FLDPW($) Miami Exp($) %PHS %PHS+
1 1993 B+ 41,666            12,557            30.1 5,964              44,615,648          3,021,046,368         50654.7% 5972.8%
2 1962 B++p 48,889            16,598            34 9,719              18,870,697          1,757,038,824         18078.4% 6145.7%
3 1986 A-g 86,253            -                   0 11,338            97,246,397          1,766,365,400         15579.2% 1626.7%
4 1989 B 6,260              3,836              61.3 3,474              4,279,884            523,404,846            15066.3% 6750.2%
5 1993 A-r 99,118            -                   0 3,986              33,584,942          449,010,936            11264.7% 1195.1%
6 1936 A-g 105,635          49,252            40.7 113,677          49,380,424          11,153,331,117       9811.4% 6840.1%
7 1996 NR-2 32,181            11,590            22.1 10,158            32,425,131          913,152,075            8989.5% 2144.4%
8 1980 A+p 1,020,786      28,844            2.8 67,505            35,846,127          3,424,581,497         5073.1% 3313.5%
9 1970 A+r 391,931          -                   0 34,801            8,629,996            1,567,816,129         4505.1% 3609.9%
10 1953 B++r 46,561            37,809            80.5 7,150              1,351,644            258,329,769            3613.0% 3038.6%
11 1989 B++ 24,772            12,807            51.7 6,286              19,582,980          147,117,476            2340.4% 568.7%
12 1988 B++ 311,203          121,055          38.9 406,140          289,615,603        9,281,827,184         2285.4% 1334.1%
13 1996 NR-2 5,419              2,476              45.7 3,593              4,705,891            81,242,845               2261.1% 979.0%
14 1997 NR-2 12,584            22,605            93.8 5,728              15,835,991          96,170,638               1679.0% 446.0%
15 1996 NR-2 83,997            70,979            84.5 106,310          38,366,052          1,684,085,394         1584.1% 1164.0%
16 1965 A-g 87,498            23,225            26.3 31,509            1,351,691            476,286,447            1511.6% 1449.4%
17 1989 B++u 46,133            40,449            87.7 26,752            1,593,556            347,395,000            1298.6% 1225.6%
18 1970 NR-2 11,283            10,702            92.5 9,221              11,549,589          106,678,100            1156.9% 513.6%
19 1935 A 8,695,245      8,004,456      91.7 5,125,298      545,498,281        56,390,387,443       1100.2% 994.4%
20 1979 B++ 23,633            6,923              29.3 8,105              24,824,920          86,518,300               1067.5% 262.7%
21 1996 NR-2 28,066            6,052              19.8 5,055              2,715,096            53,939,139               1067.0% 694.2%
22 1986 A- 51,414            48,498            80.5 15,755            7,509,736            160,592,400            1019.3% 690.3%
23 1957 A+g 156,628          159,170          97.5 64,794            7,294,634            567,887,551            876.5% 787.8%
24 1984 B-g 76,104            32,976            43.3 13,389            4,901,688            104,509,280            780.6% 571.4%
25 1974 A-g 66,403            135,259          86.7 94,795            27,308,781          730,804,570            770.9% 598.5%
26 1978 NR-3 6,610              (1,817)             -24.8 24,539            486,753                179,203,390            730.3% 716.1%
27 1981 A+r 144,196          14,217            9.9 15,463            1,370,389            112,549,210            727.9% 668.6%
28 1979 A- 150,264          37,592            25 37,452            2,184,058            267,765,687            715.0% 675.6%
29 1968 Ap 420,989          165,342          39.3 205,529          22,828,397          1,400,257,580         681.3% 613.2%
30 1919 B+ 58,480            (4,907)             -8.6 33,608            3,331,567            222,929,122            663.3% 603.5%
31 1956 B+ 35,923            13,157            30.4 9,597              5,389,521            63,181,604               658.3% 421.6%
32 1982 Ap 168,627          37,730            22.4 28,515            2,611,467            178,184,899            624.9% 572.5%
33 1980 A+p 96,231            28,844            30 29,627            14,395,061          182,830,270            617.1% 415.3%
34 1908 A+p 3,461,434      578,482          16.7 702,050          38,529,738          4,069,773,614         579.7% 549.5%
35 1934 A+p 2,078,699      923,867          44.4 1,023,620      112,671,533        5,900,407,451         576.4% 519.3%
36 1987 B+ 14,738            10,507            71.3 4,705              150,447                21,302,599               452.8% 438.7%
37 1989 A+p 53,173            5,785              10.9 15,370            775,761                67,056,250               436.3% 415.3%
38 1981 A+p 167,799          30,990            18.5 46,626            349,308                202,113,000            433.5% 430.3%
39 1910 Ap 719,424          566,824          78.8 685,842          30,762,588          2,679,968,579         390.8% 374.0%
40 1968 C+ 87,480            43,873            50.2 14,383            901,595                52,375,480               364.1% 342.7%
41 1930 Ap 60,994            39,010            63.4 20,469            2,151,001            66,649,650               325.6% 294.6%
42 1972 A-g 1,071,319      1,064,024      90.6 945,752          32,106,760          2,953,623,559         312.3% 302.1%
43 1954 A-g 281,249          253,264          88.7 341,003          9,058,628            1,064,551,000         312.2% 304.1%
44 1963 A 109,507          74,656            64.4 97,890            1,587                    302,777,600            309.3% 309.3%
45 1979 A 24,150            20,501            84.9 25,580            1,074,332            78,106,518               305.3% 293.0%
46 1968 A++g 1,482,763      1,642,477      97.2 879,659          29,704,669          2,632,217,950         299.2% 289.5%
47 1982 Ap 25,380            6,667              26.3 8,618              10,026,990          23,742,705               275.5% 127.3%
48 1938 A+g 312,286          218,747          68.8 168,502          16,516,558          429,506,800            254.9% 232.1%
49 1928 A+p 216,372          98,127            45.4 70,931            838,010                175,546,000            247.5% 244.6%
50 1967 A+r 334,967          33,075            9.8 34,177            1,676,804            79,657,803               233.1% 222.2%
51 1935 Ap 320,831          139,995          43.6 137,191          1,934,198            304,309,806            221.8% 218.7%
52 1989 B+ 6,816              4,849              71.1 5,188              75,182                  11,003,500               212.1% 209.1%
53 1988 Ap 97,351            1,317              1.4 11,525            956,218                23,730,460               205.9% 190.1%
54 1996 NR-2 53,467            25,658            44.4 11,814            55,712,213          24,154,880               204.5% 35.8%
55 1972 Ap 865,839          1,149,219      92.2 868,539          18,426,660          1,514,818,455         174.4% 170.8%
56 1987 NR-3 42                    39                    94.3 5,011              523,494                7,883,000                 157.3% 142.4%
Table 4.3
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Figure 5.1